Without migrants, pension systems could collapse in the future

Analysis — Sardaana News. This piece combines data with the editors’ assessment; assessments are marked as such.

Every country in our sample — the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Uruguay, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Russia, China, South Korea, Japan and Ukraine — has a fertility rate below the replacement level of about 2.1 children per woman. Populations are ageing fast. Our thesis is that within 10–15 years most of these countries will need migrants to keep their pay-as-you-go pension systems running. People born from 1990 onwards face a real risk of much smaller state pensions than today’s retirees. A total collapse with “no pension at all” is a risk scenario, not a forecast: official projections point to benefit cuts, higher contributions and later retirement if nothing is done.

The numbers

Country	Fertility rate (2024)	65+ share, % (2025)	65+ share, % (2040, proj.)	Old-age dependency (2025 → 2040)	GDP per capita, US$ (2025)
USA	1.63	18.4	22.0	28.5 → 35.5	90,000
Canada	1.25	20.3	24.4	31.3 → 39.4	55,700
Australia	1.48	18.1	22.3	28.2 → 36.1	65,100
New Zealand	1.57	17.6	22.7	27.3 → 36.7	49,600
Uruguay	1.4	16.3	20.4	24.7 → 31.4	25,200
Chile	1.14	14.6	21.8	21.2 → 33.1	18,000
Argentina	1.5	12.6	16.1	19.0 → 23.7	14,900
Brazil	1.61	11.5	17.7	16.6 → 26.6	10,700
Russia	1.42	17.8	21.3	27.3 → 32.8	17,500
China	1.01	14.9	26.6	21.4 → 41.6	13,900
South Korea	0.75	20.3	33.8	29.3 → 57.9	36,200
Japan	1.15	30.0	35.3	51.0 → 65.2	36,000
Ukraine	0.99	19.0	24.1	28.2 → 36.6	5,900

Old-age dependency = people 65+ per 100 people aged 15–64. Source: World Bank (WDI; Population Estimates and Projections for 2040). GDP per capita rounded.

South Korea (0.75 children per woman) and China (1.01) have the lowest fertility rates in the sample. Japan already has 51 people aged 65+ for every 100 of working age, rising to 65 by 2040. South Korea’s ratio almost doubles, from 29 to 58.

What pension forecasts say

• USA: the 2026 Social Security Trustees Report projects that the old-age (OASI) trust fund will be depleted in 2032. After that, incoming taxes would cover 78% of scheduled benefits, falling to 62% by 2100. That is a cut, not zero. The report also lowered its long-run fertility assumption from 1.90 to 1.75 and reduced assumed immigration.
• South Korea: after the 2025 reform (contributions rising from 9% to 13%), the government projects the National Pension fund will run out in 2064, or 2071 with higher returns. The National Assembly Budget Office projects 2065 (2069 in its 2026 update).
• Japan, Canada, Australia, Chile: these countries have built up large pension capital. Japan’s GPIF is a reserve of about ¥294 trillion. Canada’s CPP Investments held C$793.3 billion in March 2026. Australia’s superannuation savings reached A$4.77 trillion in June 2026 (APRA). Chile adopted a reform in 2025 that adds an employer contribution of up to 8.5%, phased in by 2033.

Russia: the worst case

In the editors’ assessment, Russia is the clearest worst case in the list:

• Lower wealth: GDP per capita is about US$17,500, against US$90,000 in the USA, US$65,000 in Australia and US$56,000 in Canada (World Bank, 2025).
• War losses: Mediazona and BBC News Russian have confirmed by name more than 200,000 Russian military deaths. These are mostly working-age men, and the real figure is believed to be higher.
• Emigration: Re:Russia estimates that 820,000–920,000 people left in the first year after the invasion. Other estimates vary.
• Fewer labour migrants: in the first half of 2026, work entries by citizens of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan fell 15%, from 2.3 million to 1.9 million (Vedomosti). Reasons cited include tighter controls and more expensive patents. RFE/RL reports plans to replace the patent system with employer-tied recruitment from 2027.
• No pension capital: since 2014, all mandatory pension contributions in Russia go to current payouts and none go to funded savings (Social Fund of Russia). The retirement age is also being raised, from 60 to 65 for men and from 55 to 60 for women, over 2019–2028.
• A shrinking cushion: the liquid assets of the National Wealth Fund fell from 4.23 trillion rubles (1 February 2026) to 3.80 trillion (1 October 2026), or 1.6% of GDP, according to the Finance Ministry and Interfax.

Other countries in the list, the editors note, both hold accumulated pension capital and remain attractive to migrants.

Ukraine: heavy losses, but a chance

Ukraine’s fertility rate is about 1.0, and UNHCR records about 5.7 million refugees from Ukraine worldwide (mid-2026). The war is also killing working-age people. The World Bank–EU–UN–Ukraine RDNA5 assessment puts recovery and reconstruction needs at US$588 billion over 2026–2035. In the editors’ assessment, large post-war reconstruction support could create jobs, attract people back and ease the pension problem somewhat. This is highly uncertain and depends on how the war ends and on security guarantees.

Counterpoints

• Migration helps but cannot fully offset ageing. The UN Population Division’s report Replacement Migration found that keeping the ratio of workers to pensioners constant would require implausibly large inflows. For South Korea, it estimated 5.1 billion migrants by 2050.
• Higher productivity, later retirement, higher employment among women and older people, and funded savings can cushion the shock.

Bottom line (editors’ assessment): for people born after 1990, the main risk is not that pensions disappear entirely. It is that they will be smaller and come later. Countries that combine reforms, pension capital and openness to migrants are better placed; Russia currently scores worst on all three.